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Corporate Social Responsibility Panel:
The Constituencies of the Corporation and the
Role of the Institutional Investor
By PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG*, Boston, Massachusetts;
ELI GOLDSTON**, Boston, Massachusetts; and
GEORGE D. GIBSON***, Richmond, Virginia

PROFESSOR PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG: We are discussing this afternoon
the constituencies of the corporation, and I have been asked to speak on
"New Directions for Employees."
Discussion of the so-called constituencies of the corporation rests on the
assumption that there is more to the corporate world than the relation of the
corporation and its Board of Directors and management to its shareholders.
It assumes that there are other groups whose lives and fortunes are vitally
affected by corporate operations, whose interests must be considered in corporation decision, and further, who may have a legitimate claim to participate
in the corporate decision-making process.
Thus, as long ago as 1919, Mackenzie King stated that the corporation
must serve the objectives not only of its shareholders, but also of its employees and the community.1 In 1929 Owen D. Young, then President of
General Electric was similarly expressing the view that the Board was to act
as a trustee not solely for shareholders, but also for employees, consumers,
and the general public. 2 These views became part of the philosophy of managerialism. This is the philosophy that the function of the Board is not, as the
law has traditionally stated, to dedicate itself with single minded loyalty to
the advancement of the interests of the shareholders, but instead to mediate
among the legitimate claims of the various corporate constituencies, of whom
shareholders constitute only one group. 3 Of the so-called constituencies, it is

* Member of the Massachusetts and New York Bars; Professor of Law, Boston University Law School.
** Member of the Massachusetts Bar.
*** Member of the Virginia Bar.
1 See, G. GOYDER, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 20 (1951); L.C.B. GOWER,
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 56, n. 29 (2d ed. 1957).
2. See, W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 239 (4th ed. unabr.
1969) [quoting SEARS, THE NEW PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER 209 (1929)].
3. See, E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS 81-82 (1971); M.
FOGARTY, COMPANY AND CORPORATION ONE LAW? 8-10 (1965); Hetherington, Fact
and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Responsibility, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 248, 277-78 (1969); Eisenberg, The Legal -Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 21 (1970).
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the employees upon whom the corporation has the most profound impact. 4
This presentation reviews the changing role of employees in their relation
to the large public corporation. This embraces at least four separate areas:
(a) Increased participation in corporate decision-making, particularly through representation on the Board of Directors.
(b) Participation in the ownership of the enterprise through employee acquisition of stock.
(c) Employee concern with job security and resistance to takeovers
and mergers; and
(d) Changing attitudes with respect to the traditional concepts of the
employee's duties of loyalty and obedience to his employer.
I. Forces for Change inthe Role of Employees
There are major forces at work creating pressures for change in the objectives and structure of the large public corporation. These forces create the
background against which possible change in the role of employees must be
evaluated.
A. The Changing Society. The outstanding characteristic of our time is
that we live in a world of change and in a world of social and environmental
crisis. Change in values, change in social institutions, change at an accelerating rate is a major factor that is at work not only in the United States but in
the world. With such changes in social attitudes and values, the large public
corporation is coming under increasingly critical review.
B. The Changing Corporation.The large corporation is changing along
with the society. It has acquired immense economic power. The 500 largest
industrial corporations do approximately 2/3 of the business and earn approximately
of the net profits after tax of all industrial corporations. In
some years, the percentage of total industrial profits earned by corporations
listed on the New York Stock Exchange has reached 90% .1 Further, it has
emerged as a dominant political and social institution of our society. Accordingly, concern with the problems of the nation is inevitably accompanied by
inquiries as to the role of business in their creation and also in their solution.
C. Changing Corporate Objectives. Corporate social responsibility has
led corporations into new areas and activities. There is increasing concern
with the very objective of the corporation. How does one reconcile service
4. See, L.C.B. GOWER, MODERN COMPANY LAW 10-11 (3rd ed. 1969) ("Insofar as

there is any true association in the modern public company it is between management
and workers rather than between the shareholders inter se or between them and managment. But the fact that the workers form an integral part of the company is ignored
by the law . . . the orthodox legal view is unreal in that it ignores the undoubted fact
that the employees are members of the company for which they work to a far greater
extent than are the shareholders whom the law persists in regarding as its proprietors.")
5. FORTUNE, May 1972, at 188; N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, 1972 FACT BOOK 30 (1969:
90.7%, preliminary data), 1970 FACT BOOK 28 (1959: 90.0%).
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to society with the drive for profit? Is the goal of the corporation primarily
the search for profit or is there a great deal more to it?
D. Lack of Accountability. As a result of the separation of ownership
and control flowing from the widespread distribution of shares, management
of the large public corporation has for practical purposes in most cases become a self-perpetuating group. Management typically lacks accountability.
E. Lack of Legitimacy. The corporation affects wide segments of society.
"Private" has become "public." Social and economic groups affected by the
corporation have no role in its direction. Even if the Board were not selfperpetuating and stockholders possessed the power of election in realistic
terms, the question of the legitimacy of a Board of Directors representing
solely shareholder interests would continue to be challenged by reform
groups, demanding that the social and economic groups affected by the corporation participate in the corporate decision-making process.
F. Changing Relations with Government. Relations with government are
changing. Business for the first time is welcoming governmental intervention
to provide shelter from the searing impact of public demand for change in
business conduct, particularly in the environmental field.
G. IncreasingImpact of European Experiences. Finally, with the growth
of the multi-national corporation, American business is experiencing in other
parts of the world different forms of industrial organization and of allocation
of economic power. These broadened horizons will inevitably be reflected in
changed American attitudes.
All these factors create forces for change in the structure of the large American public corporation in general and in the role of employees in particular.
II. Employee Representation on the Board of Directors
The proposal for employee representation on the Board of Directors is entirely academic in the United States in contrast to its increasing acceptance
in Europe.
A. An Academic Proposal in the United States. Employee representation
on the Board has been the subject of a series of so-called "public interest"
proxy proposals, 6 but it has attracted little support in the United States and
is still a concern of purely intellectual interest.
Although state corporation law has in the past permitted the election of directors by employees (as well as by creditors) where the charter or by-laws
6. See, e.g., GENERAL MOTORS CORP., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING AND, PROXY
STATEMENT, Apr. 5, 1971, at 34-37; FORD MOTOR Co., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING
AND PROXY STATEMENT, Apr. 7, 1972, at 20-21; JEWEL COMPANIES, INC., NOTICE OF
ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT, May 15, 1972 at 10-11; AMERICAN TEL. &
TEL. Co., NOTICE OF MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT, Apr. 19, 1972, at 13-15. Each
of the foregoing proposals included representatives of other groups as well as employees in the proposal to broaden the composition of the Board.
7. See. MASS. ,GEN.
LAWS, C. 156, § 23 (1932), N.J. REV. STAT. § 14.9-1 to -3 (1957)
(repealed) (employees); E. DODD & R. BAKER, I CASES on BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONSCORPORATIONS 196, n.21 (1940); cf. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 498 (rev. ed.
1946) (listing statutes providing for election by creditors).
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of the corporation so provide, 7 employee representation on the Board is relatively unknown in American corporate life.
At the present time, there is widespread acceptance of the desirability of
strengthening the Board of Directors by broadening its perspectives through
the addition of members who can introduce fresh "inputs" into the Board
decision-making process. Thus, the American corporate scene is changing
with long-neglected groups-particularly blacks and women-supplying persons who are being elected to the Boards of major corporations. At present,
approximately 70 major American corporations, as well as both the New
York and American Stock Exchanges, have added black directors; approximately 20 major corporations have added women directors. 8 It is noteworthy
that notwithstanding these developments which herald a new pattern for the
composition of the Board, there has been no inclusion of employee directors
and no serious demands for the addition of the employee point of view to
the Board.
On the surface, this appears odd, particularly in view of the obvious fact
that corporate decision-making has a greater impact on employees than on
these other groups. Why then is there such little public interest in employee
representation on the Board?
The explanation rests on the distinction between broadening the perspectives of the Board and of "special-interest" representation. The black and
women directors add a fresh point of view. They are clearly not elected as
representatives of a constituency to whom they report and are accountable.
At the same time, they also represent an attempt to give symbolic recognition
to the aspiration of long-deprived groups for fuller participation in the society
as well as to symbolize the dedication of the Board to non-discriminatory
principles in the operation of the enterprise.
It is possible to view the addition of employee members of the Board in a
similar limited role of broadening the Board's perspectives. Indeed, as we
will see, that is precisely the role of employee directors on the Boards of
British nationalized industries. However, with general acceptance of collective bargaining and recognition of the legitimacy, of unions, the pressure for
symbolic recognition is unnecessary. Further, union representation itself provides aggressive presentation of the employee point of view. Board membership is not required for such purposes.
The concept of employee representation rests on the quite different concept of "specal-interest" representation, the participation by worker representatives in corporate decision-making at the Board level. This is a proposal
to strengthen worker or union power. It is an effort to achieve increased benefits, or economic justice, for workers.
Further, the proposal for worker representation reflects a desire for indus8. See, Bus. & Soc'y, Sept. 26, 1972, at 4; N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1972, at 59, col. 2;
Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1972 at 1, col. 6; June 7, 1972, at 2, col. 2; Vanderwicken, Change
Invades the Boardroom, FORTUNE, May, 1972, at 156; TIME, Oct. 16, 1972, at 85.
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trial democracy or social justice, as well as economic justice, for employees.
It is part of an effort to achieve greater employee individual fulfillment and
job satisfaction through employee participation in decision-making on all
levels. Board representation is only an aspect of the larger movement for
greater employee participation. 9
It is a proposal that rests almost entirely on the German experience where
industry has prospered, notwithstanding two decades of employee representation on the Board and the increasing acceptance in Europe generally of the
principle of employee representation. It also reflects the successful Yugoslav
experience with worker self-management, a society where workers in the
plant play a major role in the decision-making process and in participation
in the profits of the enterprise.
The proposal attracts support from non-labor reformers who see it, among
other things, as a method of restoring accountability and legitimacy to the
Board of Directors and of transforming the large corporation from a "private" to a "public" institution.
The crucial aspect about the proposals for employee representation on the
American Board of Directors is that they do not reflect any serious objective
of the American trade union movement nor of workers generally. The proposals are being advanced without grass roots support. The cold factof the
matter is that, notwithstanding the ferment in this area abroad, American
unions and workers are simply uninterested in the proposal for Board representation. Further as Professor Robert Dahl points out, "workers and trade
unions may be the greatest barriers at present to any profound reconstruction
of economic enterprise in this country."' 10 Until such attitudes change, consideration of the advantages and problems involved in such a proposal should
be regarded as an educational exercise, not without interest and not without
possible usefulness, but completely separated from political realities.
In at least one instance, however, an American trade union has expressed
some interest in worker representation on the Board. Pilots of United Air
Lines sought Board representation at the 1972 annual meeting. The stated
objective for such representation was to improve channels of communication,
rather than participation in decision-making. The pilots' proposal received
5% of the vote. It is perhaps not without significance that the only example
of a union effort for Board representation involved a union of elite personnel, earning in some cases more than $50,000 per year. It is hard to view such
a development as involving the aspirations of the deprived masses. Further,
9. See, PAUL BLUMBERO, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1968); H. CLEGG, A NEW APPROACH TO INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1960); H. CLEGG, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND
NATIONALIZATION (1951); F. EMERY & E. THORSRUD, FORM AND CONTENT IN INDUSTRIAL

DEMOCRACY

(1969);

P.

VAN

GORKUM,

INDUSTRIAL

DEMOCRACY

IN THE

NETHERLANDS: A SEMINAR (1969); I. ADIZES, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: YUGOSLAV
STYLE (1971); IRISH MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY-A SYMPOSIUM (1969).

10. Dahl, Power to the Workers? N.Y. REV. OF' BOOKS, Nov. 19, 1970 at 20, 22.
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the proposal received no support from the national Airline Pilots Association."
B. Foreign Experience with Employee Representation and Worker SelfManagement.1 2 Support for employee representation on the Board, 'or the
more sweeping reform of employee ownership and management of industry,
arises from the extensive European experience.
1. German Co-determination.The major support for the concept of "special interest" directors arises from the German experience with "co-determination," or employee directors on the Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat), the
upper board in the two-tier German board structure. This upper board elects
the members of the Managing Board (Vorstrand) and supervises and inspects, but does not manage. The Managing Board is the executive arm of the
corporation combining both the direction of day-to-day operations and policymaking. In steel, coal and iron firms with 1000 employees or more, with
full co-determination, employee representatives comprise one-half of the
Supervisory Board and hold a veto power over the designation of the Labor
Director on the Managing Board. In other industries, with partial co-determination, employee representation is restricted to one-third of the Supervisory
Board. 13
The German model of partial co-determination-the dual board with onethird labor representation on the upper board-has been adopted in the
proposed statute for a European Company (Societas Europaea) in the European Economic Community. 14 The French Law of June 18, 1966, similarly
requires the representation of two non-voting labor directors on the boards
of public corporations (socidts anonymes).15
11. See, UAL, INC., NOTICE OF MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT, Mar. 24, 1972,
at 2-3, 13-14; Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1971, at 25, col. 5, Apr. 28, 1972, at 34, col. 1.

12. The discussion of the European experience follows the author's Book Review,
50 TEX. L. REV. 598, 610-13 (1972).
. 13. Law of May 21, 1951, [1951] BGB1. 347; Law of Oct. 14, 1952, [1952] 1
BGBI. 681; Law of Aug. 7,.1956, [1956] BGBI. 707, as amended, Law of July 15, 1957,
[1957l 1 BGBt. 714. For a general review of the German experience, see, C. DEHOUGHTON,

ed.,

THE COMPANY-LAW,

STRUCTURE, AND REFORM IN ELEVEN COUNTRIES

213-21 (1970); M.

FOGARTY, supra note 3; A. SHUCHMAN, CO-DETERMINATION: LABOR'S
MIDDLE WAY IN GERMANY (1957); H. SPmo, THE POLITICS OF CODETERMINATION

(1958); Frame, Worker Participation with ParticularReference to Codetermination
in the FederalRepublic of Germany, 5 VICT. U. L. REV. 417 (1970); Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation:Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23

(1966).
14.

COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

PROPOSED STATUTE

FOR THE EU-

Art. 137 (1), Supp. to Bull. 8-1970 of the European Communities.
See, Sanders, The European Company on Its Way, 8 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 29 (1971);
Storm, A New Impulse Towards a European Company, 26 THE BUSINESS LAWYER
ROPEAN COMPANY,

1443 (1971).
15. The works council (comitd d'enterprise) of a socidtd anonyme may appoint two
of its members who are to be present in a non-voting advisory capacity at all meetings
of the conseil d'administration (in corporations using the single board system) or the
conseil de surveillance or upper board (in corporations using the dual-board system).
Law No. 66-427 of June 18, 1966. See, CCH COMM. MKT. REP., EUROPEAN STOCK
CORPORATION

177 (P. Sanders ed. 1969).
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The results of the German experience are mixed. In steel, iron, and coal,
where labor representation includes one-half of the Supervisory Board as well
as a veto power over the designation of the Labor Director on the Managing
Board, full co-determination seems to have provided labor with an effective
share of power, has apparently contributed to reduced labor strife, and generally has worked satisfactorily. In other industries, where labor representation is restricted to one-third membership on the Supervisory Board, or partial co-determination, labor representation generally has been regarded as
not particularly meaningful. Power in fact has not been shared. Often, labor
representation has not been taken seriously and has served as a source of
sinecures for old faithful trade union officials, with management control essentially unimpaired. 16
2. Yugoslav Worker Self-Management. The Yugoslav experience with
worker-owned industry has attracted world-wide attention. As a unique
blend of socially-owned enterprise operated both for profit under market
conditions and for the benefit (after payment of capital charges) of the
workers employed in the enterprise, the Yugoslav model is most interesting.
Control is in the hands of the plant workers and the local communes, with
the League of Communists playing a significant role behind the scenes. The
shift of the locus of power from the federal government to the plant and the
local community reflects the strong centrifugal forces in Yugoslavia that make
decentralization politically desirable, in light of the divisive influences separating the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and other
ethnic groups in the nation. The development has been associated with problems of capital formation and a high level of inflation, which apparently reflect, at least in part, worker pressure for short-term profit maximization.
Paradoxically, concern with short-term objectives may be greater in worker
self-managed Yugoslav industry than in the United States where management
has been increasingly inclined to be concerned with the long-term view. 17
Whatever the intellectual interest in this experiment, it is hardly a realistic
alternative. Even Professor Dahl, one of its leading American proponents,
concedes the unlikeliness of American labor support for the program. He
visualizes its possible adoption in the United States as a result of middle class
pressure.' 8 It may be noted that at the present time there is not the slightest
indication of any support for this visionary conclusion.
3. Sweden. Sweden is moving in the direction of employee representation
on the Board. A number of companies, including Volvo, have experimented
16. See, FOGARTY, supra note 3, at 120-21, 126-28 (1965); D. GRANICK, THE EuROPEAN EXECUTIVE 220 (1962).

17. For a general review of the Yugoslav experience, see, I. ADIZES, supra note 9;
M.

BROEKMAYER,

YUGOSLAV

WORKERS'

SELF-MANAGEMENT

(1970);

DEHOGHTON,

supra note 13, at 320-36; J. KOLAJA, WORKERS' COUNCILS: THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIENCE
(1966); G. MACESICH, YUGOSLAVIA: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DEVELOPMENT
PLANNING (1964); S. PEJOVICH, THE MARKET-PLANNED ECONOMY OF YUGOSLAVIA
(1966); J. VANEK, THE PARTICIPATORY ECONOMY (1971).
18. R. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION 134-36 (1970).
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with the voluntary designation of employee directors as part of a campaign to
deal with job dissatisfaction. 9 The 1971 Conference of the Confederation of
Swedish Trade Unions has demanded the designation of 2 employee representatives on all boards. 20 Swedish Premier Olaf Palme is pressing for the
mandatory appointment of employee and government directors to the boards
21
of all companies with more than 100 employees.
4. Conflicting European Trade Union Attitudes. An illuminating aspect
of the European experience is the mixed nature of trade union reaction to
proposals for employee representation on the Board.
The English unions in the past traditionally 'opposed such representation.
As C. A. R. Crosland puts it, English union attitudes have displayed "not
merely apathy but a barely concealed hostility."' 22 They regarded Board representation as involving a confusion in roles and impairing their ability to
challenge management. The union has been perceived as "the opposition" and
therefore by definition would not participate in the exercise of Board power.
In recent years, British union attitudes have tended to change. Before the
Donovan Commission, some union representatives argued for voluntary representation on the Boards of Directors of companies. A minority of the Commission agreed, but the Commission Report regarded such a movement as
23
unwise and premature.
In sharp contrast, the German unions have regarded Board membership
as an objective of high priority. It has replaced socialism as the objective of
the trade union movement. 24 At the present time, German unions are pressing
for the extension of full co-determination or one-half representation on the
Boards of all German corporations, rather than solely in iron, coal, and
25

steel.

The Confederation of Swedish Trade Unions has taken a middle ground.
It has endorsed mandatory employee representation on the Board while emphasizing that the.Confederation would maintain its independence of action.2 6
5. Latin America. In his recent review of Latin American enterprise,
Professor Bayitch reports the establishment of co-determination in national19. 18 Bus. INT'L 175 (May 28, 1971).
20. See, Lidbon, IndustrialDemocracy in Sweden, FREE LABOR WORLD, Nov. 1971,
at 14; 11 Bus. EUROPE 310 (Sept. 24, 1971).
21. N.Y.Times, Nov. 12, 1972, § 1,at 28, col. 1.
22. C.A.R. CROSLAND, THE CONSERVATIVE ENEMY 218 (1962); See, THE FUTURE
OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 21 (Fabian Society Tract No. 344, 1963); W. PUCKEY, THE
BOARD ROOM 96-97 (1969) ("I have yet to hear a senior [English] union official give
wholehearted support to worker representation in boards in the private sector").
23. See, L.C.B. GOWER, supra note 4, at 63 n. 53, W. FRIEDMANN & J. GARNER, GovERNMENT ENTERPRISE 39 (1970).

24. See, SPmo, supra note 13, at 5, 35-36, 39-41 (1958).
25. See, Friedrich, German Co-Determination: Parity Is the Goal, COLUM. J.
1970, at 49. DE HOUGHTON, supra note 13, at 220-21, 361-68,
370; Winkhaus, Co-Determination of Employees in West Germany Companies, 27
WORLD BUS., Jan.-Feb.
THE BUSINESS LAWYER

879, 882 (1972).

26. See, note 20 supra; Geijer, IndustrialDemocracy in the Seventies, FREE LABOR
WORLD, Apr. 1971, at 15.
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ized industries in 4 countries. After observing that nationalization represented
a reaction to foreign ownership rather than a movement for social reform, he
notes that there has been provision for substantial employee representation
on the Boards of nationalized Latin American industries, including electric
utilities in Argentina, tin in Bolivia, copper in Chile, and oil and railways in
Mexico. The Peruvian industrial reform law also provides for employee mem27
bership on the Board.
C. Problems Presented by Reform Proposals Generally. The proposals
for employee representation on the Board presents serious problems.
1. Limitations on the Applicability of the European Experience. There is
a complete lack of United States experience. All we can do is speculate how
solutions attempted in cultures abroad might function at home. It is evident
that experiments in industrial organization abroad may provide some insight
and understanding in appraising possible change in American industrial organization to deal with the known problems of the existing order. This does
not mean, however, that European models may be expected to function in
the same manner in the vastly different climate in the United States. The
European experience reflects German solutions to German needs and Yugoslav solutions to Yugoslav needs. To lift these solutions from their political,
economic, historical and cultural setting and transport them to the United
States is of dubious validity. As Professor Carl Friedrich has noted, codetermination is "deeply imbedded in German past experience and traditions."'28 There are no parallels in the United States.
2. Conflict of Interest. To whom would the employee director owe primary loyalty? Under traditional corporation law, the director owes undivided
loyalty to the corporation and to the shareholders; further, such loyalty runs
to all shareholders and not merely to those who elected him. 29 Would not the
"special interest" director designated to represent the interests of the group
responsible for his designation be confronted with a fundamental conflict of
interest?
British nationalized industries have sought to avoid this problem by requiring primary loyalty to the corporation. Labor directors added to the
Boards of nationalized firms have been required to resign all formal affilia27. See, Bayitch, Empresa in Latin American Law: Recent Developments, 4 LAW399, 429-33 (1972); N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1972, at 16, col. 1;
Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1972, at 6, col. 4.
28. C. J. Friedrich, Introduction, in SPmO, supra note 13, at viii (1958). Fogarty
similarly demonstrates how co-determination reflects more than 100 years of German
experience. See, M. ForgARTY, supra note 3, at 60-153 (1965).
29. E.g., Parke v. Daily News Ltd., [1962] Ch. 927, 963; Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) ("A business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors
are to be-employed for that end.' ) See, H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 475 (2d ed.
1970); L.C.B. GOWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 474-76 (2d ed. 1957).
But see, L.C.B. GOWER, supra note 4, at 523-24 (Twelve years later, Prof. Gower regarded the traditional view as "increasingly anachronistic" and concluded: "Further
YER OF THE AMERICAS

developments in the law in this respect seem inevitable-and overdue").
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tion with the trade union movement. The labor directors come to the Board
as persons with a trade union perspective, but not as representatives of the
30
trade union movement. The same pattern has occurred in Norway.
If, however, the employee director comes not simply as a person with a
labor perspective, but as a "representative," the problem of conflict seems
inevitable so long as there is no corresponding change in the objectives of the
enterprise.
This would be the result if isolated employee "representatives" were
added to the Boards of American Corporations as presently constituted. On
the other hand, if theconcept of "special interest" representation were accompanied by a broadening of the objectives of the corporation and the advancement of shareholder interests were no longer the primary goal, the
premise of undivided loyalty to shareholders would disappear. The question
would then arise whether the loyalty of the employee director to the workers
or union which designated him was inconsistent with the new objectives set
for the enterprise.
Thus, it would appear that in the end, "special interest" representation
accompanied by restatement of the goals of the corporation would require
the fashioning of new fiduciary standards for directors to reflect the changed
composition of the Board and the revised objectives of the corporation. Such
standards would almost inevitably involve the realization that except in most
unusual circumstances, "special interest" representatives would place loyalty
to the group which designated them and which they represent above all other
loyalties: whether to the enterprise as a whole, the community, or the nation.
The Board would then function essentially as a political institution. There
is a serious question whether such a Board could effectively function in the
face of the pressures on the individual Board members to advance the interests of the groups which they represent. Thus, in France, the tri-partite structure of nationalized corporations with government, employee, and consumer
directors has been strongly criticized as resulting "in a constant tug-of-war
between the different representatives and interests instead of providing a bal'31
anced administration in the public interest."
3. Effectiveness of the Employee Director.Without regard to the troubling
question of loyalties, the imposition of a minority number of employee directors upon an unwilling Board may accomplish little. The hostility of the
majority of the Board may remove much of the significance of the development. If decisions are made in caucus prior to the Board meeting which is
then reduced to an empty formality, if there is an inadequate flow of information, if there is limited cooperation from management, the employee di30. See, W. FRIEDMANN & J. GARNER, supra note 23, at 39 (1970); A. STURMTHAL,
WORKERS COUNCILS 56-57 (1964); W. ROBSON, NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC
OWNERSHIP 217 (1960); M. FOGARTY, A COMPANIES ACT 1970?, at 75 (P.E.P. No.
500, Oct. 1967); F. EMERY & E. THORSRUD, supra note 9, at 13 (Norway).
31. See, W. FRIEDMANN & J. GARNER, supra note 23, at 113, 315; Jacoby, Who
Should Be on the Board?, CENTER MAGAZINE, Jan./Feb. 1972, at 73, 74.
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rector will not be able to function effectively, as illustrated by the German
experience with partial co-determination. Minority representation has built-in
limitations.
4. Wisdom of the Proposal.A fundamental objection may be made to the
wisdom of the proposal. What is the objective? Is it to advance the interests
of the employees of the firm? Is it. to advance the interests of employees
generally in the society? Is it to advance the "public interest"?
It is clear that employee Board representation may be desired in order
to introduce a measure of countervailing power in the highest levels of the
corporation that will strengthen the position of employees in the firm versus
the management. As noted previously, many trade unions, particularly in
England, have not always been convinced that this is in fact the case, and
have concluded, at least in the past, that union power would be compromised
and weakened by representation on the Board. In contrast, the German unions have firmly embraced the principle. Employee representation regarded
in this light merely becomes a new chapter in labor relations, although on a
grand scale. The values involved relate to the relative positions of labor and
management in the society, and the social desirability of further strengthening union power as well as the question of the appropriateness of achieving
such an objective through the device of restructuring the corporate organization rather than in some other manner, such as the collective bargaining
process.
If, however, employee representation on the Board is regarded as a method
of advancing the interest of workers as a whole, not merely those employed
by the corporation, the German and the Yugoslav experience would both
appear to demonstrate that it is unlikely that any such objective will be
achieved. Worker power on the Board is reflected in improved conditions for
workers in the corporation. It does not appear to be concerned with the
aspirations and problems of workers elsewhere in the country.
If this is the case, it is even more doubtful to expect that employee representation will advance the interest of the public as a whole. After all, it is
"special interest" not "public interest" representation which is being proposed.
There is a further consideration. Employee representation transfers to the
Board level the struggle between the competing interests. It is far from clear
that it is desirable to have labor negotiations conducted in the Board room.
In view of the significant impact that the ultimate terms of the labor bargain
have on the society as a whole, there are major advantages in having the
conflict conducted in the traditional arena where public scrutiny is possible
and where public attitudes may influence the result.
To the extent that the proposal for employee representation'is intended as
a method of increasing union power, it may also fairly be asked whether such
representation is require l to enable the major unions to deal in equal terms
with the major industries, whether such representation would advance the
interests of any group other than the workers directly affected, and whether
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employee directors are any more likely than other directors to be concerned
with the impact of the corporation's operations on the consumer, on the community, on the environment, or indeed, on other workers generally.
5. The Significance of the Proposal. The discussion of employee representation on the Board requires at least passing reference to the fundamental
question of whether the Board of Directors does in fact determine corporate
policy or whether the non-management or "outside" directors are relatively
impotent prisoners of senior management or the chief executive officer. To
the extent that "outside" directors are part-time and under-compensated, lack
staff support, and are not truly independent of the management which has
designated them in the first place, there are increasing doubts as to the realities of Board power, except perhaps in rare times of crisis. The ultimate
question accordingly is whether employee representation, although independent, could have a significance that would transcend the existing limitations on the exercise of corporate sovereignty by the Board.
III. Employee Stock Ownership
Employee stock ownership as a method of increasing employee participation in the control of the corporation and assuring a role in the decisionmaking process has made relatively little progress either in the United States
or in Europe.
A. Indirect Ownership through Employee Benefit Funds. A major problem in the development of a sufficiently large employee equity stake in the
enterprise to create a significant employee influence in management or participation in profits has been the difficulty of accumulating the substantial
capital required. The employee trust fund, investing in the purchase of shares
of the employer corporation, provides a possible alternative to accomplish
this result.
The influence on management will depend on the procedure for voting
the shares held by the trust. In the typical case, where the shares are voted by
trustees appointed (and often subject to removal) by the Board of Directors,
the employee trust fund-far from increasing the relative power of employees
-becomes a device for further strengthening the entrenched position of
management through the creation of captive votes.
Where an enlightened management wisely declines the opportunity to vote
a large bloc of trust-held shares for itself and provides for "pass-through"
voting by the employee-beneficiaries, a framework has been created under
which employees as a group conceivably play a significant role as indirect
2
shareholders.A
32. See, Eisenberg, Megasubsidiaries: The Effect of Corporate Structure on Corporate Control, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1577, 1597-98 (1971); Hone, Pass Through Voting:
An Analysis, 17 PROFIT SHARING, Oct. 1969, at 22 (Hone lists 101 such corporations).

The New York Stock Exchange requires as a condition of listing that corporations with
approximately one per cent or more of their voting shares held by the corporation's
pension or similar fund establish procedures for pass-through voting.
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An outstanding instance is Sears, Roebuck & Company, where 20.4% of
the outstanding shares (or more than $3.6 billion market value) were held
by the Sears Savings and Profit Sharing Pension Fund for the benefit of 222,866 participants as of December 31, 1971 and voted on a "pass-through"
5
basis by vested participants under a procedure that assured a secret ballot.A
This procedure theoretically permits effective control of the corporation by
the participants. However, there is no indication that employees have attempted torexercise such control or, indeed, desire to do so. Further, the participants with an average interest of approximately $17,000 each in the trust
fund no doubt regard their indirect interest in the corporation as an investment rather than as a form of industrial democracy. The participant as investor has supplanted the participant as employee.
B. The Kelso Plans. Mr. Louis Kelso has advocated plans under which
undercapitalized firms would raise needed capital utilizing pre-tax dollars
through tax-deductible contributions to qualified pension or profit sharing
trust funds (or through bank loans to such funds in anticipation of such contributions), which in turn would be re-invested in the purchase of company
shares. The participating corporation receives back not only its contribution,
but realizes a tax saving as well, which at a 50% rate would provide the corporation with twice the amount available if it had simply retained the earnings in the first place. The corporation shares are ultimately distributed to
the employees. Thus, a measure of employee ownership is achieved. Presumably over a long enough period, the bulk of outstanding shares would
be employee-owned. Although the Kelso Plan has attracted increasing attention, it involves serious potential dilution for existing shareholders, and
obviously has appeal only to capital-hungry firms unable to raise funds
through any other route. A variation of the Kelso Plan has been proposed by
34
Governor Ferr6 in Puerto Rico.
Whatever the usefulness of the Kelso Plans as methods of raising capital,
they will not hold out serious promise for significant social change unless
employees regard the shares not as an investment, but as enfranchisement
33. SEARS, ROEBUCK & Co., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT,
Apr. 20, 1972, at 1, 4; Letter to Fund members dated Apr. 23, 1971 from Austin T.
Coleman, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Sears Savings and Profit Sharing
Pension Fund. Contrast Federated Department Stores which has successfully resisted
demands for the institution of a pass-through voting system with respect to its 3,137,249
shares (or 7.2% of the outstanding shares) held by its Retirement, Income and Thrift
Incentive Plan. FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., REPORT OF THE ANNUAL
MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS, June 1, 1971, at 2; L. & J. GILBERT, THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVITIES AT CORPORATION MEETINGS 251-259

(1971).
34. L. KELSO & P. HETTER, Two-FACTOR THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF REALITY
(1967); Kelso, The Invisible Violence of Corporate Finance, INVESTOR RELATIONS
1972 (Proceedings of 2d Annual National Conference of National Investor Relations
Institute, Nov. 1, 1971), at 133; Kelso & Hetter, Man without Property, Bus. & Soc'Y
REV., Summer 1972, at 14; see, Henderson, Radical Capitalism, BUSINESS TODAY,
Autumn 1970 at 10; Bus. WEEK, Nov. 20, 1971, at 86; N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1972, § 1,

at 29, col. 1.
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leading to employee participation in the direction of the enterprise. The Sears,
Roebuck experience does not indicate that this is likely.
Further, the stake of each individual employee in the corporation through
such stock ownership must be significant enough to produce such a meaningful change in his fundamental attitudes. As Robert Heilbroner has noted, a
relatively trivial equity stake in the corporation has only a tangential relationship to the achievement of significant participation in decision-making. 35
C. Isolated United States Experience. There is some limited experience
in the United States with employee-owned concerns. Recently, the Chicago &
Northwestern Railway was sold to a newly organized corporation owned by
1,000 of the railroad's 13,500 employees, including senior executives, who
invested approximately $3,600,000. This appears, however, to represent
more an ingenious method for the parent, Northwest Industries, Inc., to divest
itself of its railroad operations and $338,804,000 of railroad debt. it hardly
constitutes a grass-roots effort by employees to achieve a new society. Thus,
the three-man Board of Directors of the employee-owned enterprise consists
of two senior executives and an outside director, who also are trustees of a
trust, which will hold the sole right to vote for directors and certain other
matters for a ten-year period. 6
Other isolated examples of firms in which employees have a significant
equity interest include Levi Strauss & Co., Lincoln Electric (Cleveland,
Ohio), American Cast Iron Pipe Company (Birmingham, Ala.), and Merrimack Hat Company (Amesbury, Massachusetts) now in dissolution. There
are no signs that these examples represent any significant trends or any
meaningful employee participation in management.
D. The European Experience.
1. France. Approximately 5 years ago, Premier Charles De Gaulle undertook to introduce "popular capitalism" into France by partial distribution
of "surplus profits," after dividends and adjustments, to employees in the
form of shares of stock of the corporation, with the ultimate objective of
substantially broadening employee ownership of corporate enterprise. Equity
participation within the firm was to be a new middle way between socialism
and capitalism.
Under the decree of August 17, 1967, employees of all French companies
with more than 100 employees became entitled to a statutory right of profit
sharing.
35. Conversation with R. Heilbroner, On Power and the Corporation,Bus. & Soc'y
Ross, THE DEMOCRATIC FIRM 3-4 (Fabian
Research Series 242, 1964) ("The employee-shareholder remains predominantly a
wage or salary earner and in any fundamental conflict of interest within the firm, is
unlikely to be deflected from the pursuit of his primary interest. . . . Employeeshareholding is, in fact, a rather neat way of dodging the fundamental issue of employee rights in modern industrial society.")
REV., Summer 1972, at 10, 12. See, N.

36. CHICAGO & NORTH WEST TRANSPORTATION Co., OFFERING CIRCULAR, May 5,
1972, at 10, 20, 35-36, 47; Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1970, at 2, col. 1, June 2, 1972, at 2,
col. 2; N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1970, § 3, at 2, col. 4; Bus. WEEK, Dec. 9, 1972, at 48.
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The program involved the following elements:
(a) The profit-sharing allocation for the benefit of employees was
retained by the employer and was available for reinvestment.
(b) The securities allocated to employees were frozen for a five year
period and not available for distribution nor transfer by employees,
except in the event of death.
(c) As a result of tax incentives, the cost to the employer was negligible so long as its new investment in plant and equipment exceeded
the profit-sharing allocation for the previous year. This result was
achieved by giving the employer a tax deduction for new investment
equal to twice the allocation for the previous year.
Estimates of the impact of the plan vary with the rate of return of the enterprise and the relation of labor cost to total value added. Fogarty provides
examples of the operation of the program which appeared in Le Monde.
These indicated profit allocations of up to 5.7% of total remuneration. 7
The profit-sharing allocation could be evidenced not only by shares of the
enterprise, but also either by debt or by investment certificates reflecting investment in other corporations.
In December 1970, under the program, Renault, the state-owned automobile corporation, distributed to 45,600 employees a total of 542,000 shares
with a market value of $9.8 million, or an average of more than $200 per
employee. This represented 4.5 % of the outstanding shares. The distribution
was made according to seniority and rank to white and blue collar employees
with 5 years of service.-3
This program, sponsored by left-wing Gaullists, such as Louis Vallon, met
bitter opposition from both the right and left wings of French politics, who
viewed it as dangerous radicalism on the one hand, or as an inadequate palliative, distracting workers from a major reconstruction of the social and
economic order, on the other. The program has lost support and been rejected as unsuccessful.
2. English proposals. There has been discussion in England of the desirability of restricting stockholders to a fixed return. "Excess" earnings
would be reallocated for the benefit of employees, either directly or through
capitalization, with the shares evidencing the capitalized earnings distributed
to employees who would ultimately come to control the enterprise. Still another suggestion has been a program for allocation of a portion of earnings
as a mandatory sinking fund to redeem non-employee owned shares over
37. See, DEHOUGHTON, supra note 13, at 80, 107-16; Law No. 67-673 of August 17,
1967 implemented by Decree No. 67-112 of Dec. 19, 1967; FOGARTY, supra note 30,
at 112-15; 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 6567; FOGARTY, supra note 3, at 112 (correction sheet); Marty-Lavauzelle, Labor Law Developments in France, 27 THE BusINEss LAWYER

857, 857-58 (1972).

38. Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1970, at 7, col. 2.
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the long term, as an alternative method of ultimately achieving full employee
9
ownership.A
There is no indication that these proposals have attracted significant support.
3. German proposals. The German trade unions have urged a profitsharing program that contrasts sharply with the French statutory reform and
the English proposals which have sought to achieve ultimate transfer of
ownership of the firm to employees. The German unions in the past have
proposed that a portion of earnings be transferred to investment trusts, in
which all employees, including those in other industries and in public service,
would participate. Thus, workers would participate in a diversified trust portfolio rather than in shares of their employer. 40 This German proposal rested
on ideological considerations. The German unions deemed it undesirable for
workers to identify too closely with their own enterprise lest they be tempted
to advance their parochial plant interests at the expense of the working class,
or community, as a whole. In the current election, the Social Democratic
party is pressing for a program to give workers an ownership stake in German
41
companies.
E. Peru. Following the revolution in Peru four years ago, the new military government instituted an industrial reform law under which workers
receive 10% of profits before taxes in cash and 15% in shares to be distributed until employees control one-half of industrial companies. Initially,
there is one employee board member, with provision for increase as employee stock ownership increased. Businessmen anticipate loss of control
over their businesses in 5 to 10 years. Related statutes were also42 enacted
with respect to fishing, mining and telecommunications companies.
F. World-wide Voluntary Experiments in Employee Ownership. There
have been occasional experiments in various countries to establish some form
of industrial democracy where private firms have been dedicated by their
owners to employee ownership. Thus, Mr. George Goyder has provided a detailed description of the system established in 1896 for the Carl Zeiss Works
in Germany. We have already noted parallel developments in the United
States. The common aspect of such developments, notwithstanding their innovative character, is that they are no more than isolated experiences usually
reflecting personal or family philanthropy rather than any social movement of
43
significant strength.
39. See, G. GOYDER, supra note 1,at 93-96, 98, 108-20 (1951); G. GOYDER. THE
RESPONSIBLE COMPANY 81-82, 104-05 (1961) FOGARTY, supra note 30, at 99-100;
L.C.B. GOWER, supra note 4, at 62.
40. See, M. FOGARTY, COMPANIES BEYOND JENKINS 55 (P.E.P. No. 486, Feb. 1965),
FOGARTY, supra note 3, at 182-83.
41. See, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 7, 1972, at 42; Friedrich, German Co-Determination:
Party Is the Goal, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1970, at 49.
42. See, Bayitch, supra note 27, at 424-25, 429, 432; N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1972, at 16,
col. 1; Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1972, at 6, col. 4.
43. G. GOYDER, supra note 1, at Appendix B; Ulman, Bringing Robert Owen Up to
Date, Wall St. J., June 23, 1972, at 11, col. 3.
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G. Summary. Nothing in the experience to date with employee ownership
through accumulation of shares indicates that this alternative will be a major
factor in the reallocation of corporate power or in increased participation by
employees in corporate affairs.
IV. Employee Concern with Job Security; Resistance to Take-Overs and
Mergers
Notwithstanding the acceleration of merger and takeover activity in the
United States, there has been little pressure for statutory protection of affected
employees. On isolated occasions, there has been employee resistance to
the take-over. Thus, an attempted raid on Endicott Johnson was defeated
with the assistance of employees, who purchased shares to help defend the
local management. This is a rare instance of corporate "loyalty" on the part
of employees, attributable, no doubt, in large measure to the extent of identification of the firm with the local area and a xenophobic reaction to out44
siders.
In Europe, however, there has been statutory protection under which consultation with employees is required for mergers, relocation, and shutdowns.
Thus, both the German Works Council Act, 197245 and the Netherlands Employees Council Act, 1971,46 require consultations with the works council on
such matters, with elaborate procedures for mediation in the event of disagreement. This is employee participation in decision-making on the high
strategic level.
The English have no comparable requirement. However, concern with
reduction in the number of employees following takeovers led English unions
to join with the management of Watneys in an unsuccessful effort to resist the
recent takeover by Grand Metropolitan Hotels as well as to oppose other
takeovers. 47 This was a form of "corporate loyalty" comparable to the Endicott Johnson experience. Similarly, the English have become increasingly
concerned with "asset stripping: or the takeover of firms, with the intent to
reduce the scale of operations and the number of employees and to achieve
recovery of the bulk of the purchase price through the sale of the redundant
assets. This practice has become increasingly controversial, because of the
48
adverse impact on employees.
44. See, Mahoney, What Happened at Endicott Johnson after the Band Stopped
Playing, FORTUNE, Sept. 1962, at 126.
45. CCH, GERMAN WORK COUNCILS ACT 1972, §§ 111-13.
46. See, Van de Ven, Corporate Developments in the Netherlands, 27 THE Busi-

873, 874-75 (1972).
47. See, letter to shareholders dated May 1972 of Watney Mann Trade Union Defence Council ("For how much longer can the practice of buying and selling the
future of loyal workforces, and the dissolution of famous Company names be allowed
to blemish the social and industrial fabric of this country"?); London Financial Times
May 31, 1972, Aug. 4, 1972, Sept. 19, 1972. I am grateful to Eli Goldston, Esq. for
calling these materials and those cited in note 43 inlra to my attention.
48. London Sunday Times, June 11, 1972 at 59; The Guardian, June 9, 1972;
London Financial Times, Oct. 24, 1972; THE LISTENER, June 15, 1972, at 789-90.
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V. New Developments with respect to the Employee's Duty of Loyalty
and Obedience
With general acceptance of the concept of corporate social responsibility
and with the major public corporation assuming a role of increasing significance in social problem solving, there is increasing expression of a new, and
still controversial, view that the corporation should be regarded as a social
institution to achieve social objectives, rather than as an economic institution
to be operated for economic objectives for the benefit of shareholders. This
new view of the corporation has a dramatic impact upon traditional concepts
of the duties of loyalty and obedience of the employee to his employer, firmly
recognized in the law of agency.
The conflict is illustrated by the increasing number of recent developments
relating to the right of the employee of the large public corporation to take
action adverse to the interests of his employer, reflecting his personal view
as to the proper social responsibility of his corporate employer.
In view of the limited time available today and the fact that I have elsewhere discussed this interesting development at considerable length in a recent article, 49 1 shall do no more than sketch hastily some instances that have
sharply posed these questions.
(1) Mr. Ralph Nader has established a Clearing House for Professional
Responsibility and has urged employees to disclose information about their
employers' practices that they consider harmful to public or consumer interests. Mr. Nader terms this "whistle-blowing" and calls for employee disclosure whenever in the employee's judgment "responsibility to society
transcends responsibility to his organization." 50
(2) Another example involves Eastern Air Lines. The airline's procedure
required pilots after take-off to jettison in the atmosphere a small amount of
excess fuel. A senior pilot had unsuccessfully sought to have the procedure
changed to permit draining on the ground and thereby avoid atmospheric pollution. He thereon violated the regulation and had the fuel drained while on
the ground. Eastern discharged him, pointing out that "each of its 3,700
pilots cannot make his own rules." After considerable publicity and union
pressure, the pilot was reinstated. 5 '
(3) A third example is the attempt of a small number of black employees
calling themselves the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement to force
Polaroid to cease doing business in South Africa by "confrontation" tech49. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and
Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 279 (1971) reprinted in CORPORATE COUNSEL'S ANNUAL-1972, at 3 (1972).
50. See, R. NADER, P. PETAKS, & K. BLACKWELL, WHISTLE BLOWING (1972); N.Y.
Times, Jan. 15, 1971, at 43, col. 2, Jan. 27, 1971, at 32, col. 3, Mar. 21, 1971, § 6, at

16, col. 5; Branch, Courage Without Esteem: Profiles in Whistle Blowing, WASHINGTON
MONTHLY, May 1971, at 23.
51. TimE, Nov. 2, 1970, at 40; Boston Globe, Nov. 8, 1970, at 2, col. 3.

Corporation Constituencies and Institutional Investor Role • 195
niques including boycott of Polaroid products and picketing, disruptions
and demonstrations. Polaroid responded on a number of levels, including the
use of an advisory committee of employees who visited South Africa. Eventually, Polaroid suspended one of the leaders of the movement without pay
"for her persistent activities in fomenting public disapproval" of the firm and
for being "involved in a deliberate campaign calculated to damage the "well
52
being" of the company.
(4) A final example is the Ohio steel worker who was suspended for five
days for refusing to obey a foreman's order to dump oil and other wastes into
the Cuyahoga River. After a threat of a wildcat strike by the United Steel
53
Workers local, the employee was reinstated.
These acts reflect a new view of responsibility on the part of employees: a
view that the employee's duty as a citizen transcends his duty as employee, a
view that the employee should act primarily for the good of the countryi.e. the public interest-rather than for the good of the employer. They also
may involve a different concept, a view that employees should play a part in
the corporate decision-making process, particularly in issues of public concern involving questions of corporate social responsibility.
These manifestations provide an insight into forces making for a changing
relationship of the employee to the corporation that, in my opinion, may well
prove to be more significant in the United States than the academic proposals
for employee representation on the Board and employee ownership of stock.
VI. Prospects for Acceptance of Reform
There is no indication at the present time that radical change in the American corporate structure to include employees representation in the senior
councils of the corporation is apt to become a serious possibility in the'near
future. Until the proposal for employee representation is adopted and vigorously pursued by American trade unions, it is purely a theoretical suggestion.
Further, there is the inescapable fact that American trade unions do not represent American employees as a whole. Out of a total labor force of 83,000,000, 51 only 20,000,000 are union members. 55
Nevertheless, there are powerful factors at work at fundamental levels
which in time could make the possibility of employee representation, in particular, a challenging reality. Accordingly, the possibility of such a development cannot be dismissed.
A. ChangingAttitudes of Employees. It is clear that the fundamental rela52. Boston Globe Oct. 18,1970, at 64, col. 2, Nov. 1, 1970, at B-31, col. 3, Nov. 25,
1970 at 7, Feb. 11, 1971, at 3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1971, at 9,col. 1, at 23,
Feb. 21, 1971, at 17, col. 1; Bus. WEEK, Nov. 14, 1970, at 32; NEWSWEEK, Jan. 25,
1971.
53. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1971, at 50, col. 7.
54. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 210
(1971).
55. Id. at 234.

196 • The Business Lawyer, March 1973

tion of the employee to the employer is undergoing change. The attitudes of
employees toward work are a matter of increasing concern. Job alienation,
increased absenteeism, increased labor turn-over, declining productivity, resistance to dull and repetitive work assignments, weak morale, hostility
toward the production line, are familiar features of the current scene and
have made business aware of the importance of increasing job satisfaction.
56
Lordstown is today a part of the vocabulary.
Human fulfillment through participation in decision-making has been recognized as one of the most effective methods of dealing with the problem of
worker alienation. Enfrancisement and involvement in job organization, work
allocation and production have become established techniques for labor participation.5 7 The pressures that make for such participation at the grass-roots
level may conceivably over the long pull make for representation on the
Board level as well.
Added to this underlying dissatisfaction with work is the growing phenomenon of employee dissent. The emergence of "underground" employee
newspapers, highly critical of employer policies,5 8 leafletting on company
premises, 59 and boycotts by employees protesting company attitudes, 60 the
phenomenon of "whistle blowing" or unauthorized disclosure of company
conduct deemed socially undesirable by the employee in questionol-all illustrate the current ferment. Employer-employee relationships are obviously
being affected by the profound and accelerating change in society itself. The
magnitude in the degree of change of values, of attitudes, of so-called consciousness may conceivably create a social and political climate in which employee representation on the Board-entirely visionary at the present timecould become a realistic possibility in the future.
The foregoing factors will undoubtedly strengthen a movement toward
greater job participation and employer-employee interaction at the grass roots
level. Such a movement may well mean greater employee participation in
the decision-making process on the lower levels of management. This may in
turn lead ultimately to pressure for employee representation on Board level.
However, a number of students of worker participation have concluded that
Board representation may be distinctly less useful and less important in
56. Bus. WEEK, Sept. 9, 1972, at 79, 108 (Special Issue on Productivity); Mar. 4,
1972, at 69; Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1972, at 1, col. 6, Sept. 12, 1972, at 12, col. 3.
57. See, note 9 supra.

58. Bus. WEEK, Oct. 9, 1971, at 86; Bus. & Soc'Y, Sept. 5, 1972, at 2; Wall St. J.,
Nov. 3, 1971, at 16, col. 2.
59. CORPORATE INFORMATION CENTER, CORPORATE EXAMINER 5 (Sept. 1972).
(2,000 anti-U.S. Savings Bonds leaflets distributed as an anti-war demonstration at Bell
Laboratories, Homdel, N.J.)
60. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1971, at 17, col. I (Polaroid Chemist, leader of Polaroid
Revolutionary Workers Movement, dismissed for organizing a boycott of Polaroid
products to protest its business in South Africa).
61. See, note 50 supra.
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achieving the values that flow from worker participation than opportunities
62
on the plant level.
Further, these elements may emerge as a part of the political scene if there
is any development of a populist political movement. Political challenge to
the large corporation will almost inevitably include, among other ihings,
proposals for the introduction of employees into the senior decision-making
63
processes of the corporation.
B. Federal Incorporation. The development of interest in federal incorporation of major corporations6 4 may create the stage for consideration of
employee representation on the Board. The increasing abdication by the
various states of control over the internal conduct of corporate affairs and
increased concern with the role of the large corporation in society make enactment of a federal incorporation statute within the next 15 years a realistic
65
possibility.
The open question is the substantive content of any such statute. That is
quite another question, and one for which we have little glimpse as to what
may be expected. It is clear, however, that consideration of such a fundamental departure as a federal incorporation statute would inevitably involve
a basic review of possible areas of corporate reform. Consideration of employee representation on the Board would find a priority place on any such
agenda.
C. Impact of the EuropeanExperience. A third fundamental factor is the
strength of the movement for employee directors outside of the United States.
The world is increasingly becoming smaller and the experiences of other nations increasingly significant at home. The widespread European acceptance
of employee representation on the Board will unmistakably have impact on
American business attitudes.
In addition, the multi-national experience of many large American corporations has profound implications. Firsthand experience with the reality
of employee representation can only increase understanding of the proposal
and reduce resistance to it: Business that operates its foreign subsidiaries successfully notwithstanding employees on the foreign subsidiaries' boards can62. See, PAUL BLUMBERG, supra note 9, at 2-3; F. EMERY & E. THORSRUD, supra
note 9, at 10.
63. See, J. NEWFIELD & J. GREENFIELD, A POPULIST MANIFESTO 173 (1972).
64. See, Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations:An Introduction, 61 GEo.
L. J. 71 (1972); Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations:A Proposal, 61 GEO. L. J.
89 (1972); Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations:Constitutional Challenges, 61
GEO. L. J. 123 (1972) Nader, The Case for Federal Incorporation Address, Conference on Corporate Accountability, Oct. 30, 1971; Flynn, Corporate DemocracyWho Needs It? Address, Conference on Corporate Accountability, Oct. 30, 1971;
N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1971, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
65. Cf. Senator Hart (Michigan) who favors federal incorporation informed a
Georgetown Law Center seminar in February 1972 that "my most optimistic guess is
that we might get six votes right now in the whole Senate." (Statement from Office of
Sen. Hart for release Feb. 3, 1972.)
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not readily contend that such representation produces unworkable results.
Recognition of the dual board structure and employee representation will
clearly receive further impetus in the event the Common Market adopts the
European Company Draft Statute which incorporates these concepts.
Further, the British entry into the Common Market will encourage British
consideration of the principles of partial co-determination and of the dual
board embodied in the European Company Draft Statute. This will accelerate the educational process by which American business becomes more familiar with the concept of employee representation. British law and institutions exert considerable influence on American thought. If partial co-determination crosses the Channel to Great Britain, the chances of its jumping the
Atlantic are considerably increased. 60
Finally, the objective of the extension of full co-determination, or
membership on the Supervisory Board, to German industry generally has
been firmly embraced by the German trade union movement and by the Social Democratic Party. If accepted in Germany, the reverberations will
clearly have a wide range of influence.
VII. Conclusion
Employee representation is presently no more than a topic for academic
discussion in the United States. Nevertheless, there are deep-seated underlying forces that could conceivably make proposals of this nature a matter of
realistic concern in the future.6
MR. GEORGE D. GIBSON: Our next speaker, with three Harvard degrees,
might well be expected to prove a perceptive traditionalist. On the contrary,
he is distinguished for his originality and innovation.
MR. ELI GOLDSTON: As an erstwhile lawyer, I would remind you that
you can take the boy out of the law, but you can't take the law out of the boy.
So to the extent that a lawyer becomes a businessman, when he looks at his
function he carries with him some of the lawyer's traditional concern for
logic and legitimacy in the things he does. He looks for reason and he looks
for morality because he wants to feel that what he is doing carries with it a
sense of rationality, and a sense of continuity of a moral tradition. As a consequence, as more lawyers run more businesses, and as more business school
graduates run more businesses, the function of the lawyer in relationship to
the larger corporation is going to change a little because he is going to find
that-as I am going to turn to a bit later-"maximization" is no longer an
adequate economic description of a professionalized business management.
At the same time, the business manager can't run around just trying to
be loved by everybody-perhaps by doing as Professor Phillip Blumberg sug66. See, Vagts, The European System, 27 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 165, 168 (Special
Issue, Feb. 1972).
67. See, Shonfield, Business in the Twenty-First Century, DAEDALUS, Winter 1969,

at 202-3.
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gests-having employees on your Board of Directors, women, some blacks,
some homosexuals-just to make everybody happy!
Making everybody happy simply is not the essential function of an economic organization in our business society.
You know, there is an old Israeli story about an elderly gentleman who
was taking his grandson to town on a very hot day in the summer when it was
about ninety degrees in the shade and there wasn't any shade. They had a
donkey and the grandfather put the weary little boy on the donkey. As they
went down the dusty road they came to a corner, and a fellow was there who
said, "Little boy, this is awful! Your poor, tired, old gray-haired and bearded
grandfather is walking in the dusty road and you are riding on the donkey!"
So the grandfather said, "You get off. I'll get on. Keep him happy."
They went on down the road a little bit and another fellow sitting along the
roadside said, "Old man, you are riding on that donkey, and your little grandson is trudging in the dust. He's only a little fellow and the dust is getting into
his nostrils. The poor kid will drop dead!"
So the grandfather reached over and scooped up the little boy and put him
on the donkey with him and they went around the next corner. There they
ran into a chap from the Israeli branch of the Society Against Cruelty to
Animals, and this fellow said, "You two human beings riding on that poor
donkey! It is ninety degrees in the shade. A human being can barely struggle
along the dusty road and you two guys are riding on one little donkey!"
The grandfather said to the little boy, "Let's get off." Then he noticed a
tree on the side of the road, a little sapling, and he cut it down. He said to the
little boy, "Look, I am done with criticism!" So they made a kind of a pole
and they tied the donkey's two front feet together and his back feet together,
and they put the pole between them, and the little boy took one end of the
sapling, and the grandfather took the other end, and down the dusty road they
went, carrying the donkey hanging from the sapling.
Soon they came to a little bit of a river and tried to ford it. The tired little
boy stumbled, and the donkey fell into the little river, feet tied together. The
donkey couldn't help himself and he drowned.
One milght say that this story proves the difficulty of achieving consensusor, as they say in Israel, if you try to please everybody, you are going to lose
your ass!
That, I think, is the fundamental thing for counsel to remember when
you advise the businessman that he has to be kind to labor and be nice to the
women and help out the homosexuals and just do nice things for everybody.
Primarily the function of your businessman client is to bring some profit down
to the bottom line so that the business can survive. To the extent that there is
criticism of business concentration on the bottom line, it is really very irritating sometimes for a businessman when he considers the source.
Our gas company in Boston has a better record on improving Negro employment than any university in the State of Massachusetts, with the single
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exception of the Harvard Yard Police, and yet every week or so we get letters
from various professors and student groups around New England, wanting
to know what we are doing about this, and what we are doing about that. It
is important for us, I think, as businessmen, to respond to our critics, because,
until people realize how complex these things are, they tend to find the wrong
devil and exorcizing the wrong devil doesn't solve the problem.
We had some young fellows who came to see us a bit ago about Harvard's
ownership of Gulf Oil stock. Some black students at Harvard got mad at
Gulf because Gulf is allegedly doing some things in Angola the students dislike. They wanted Harvard to sell its Gulf stock.
Now the theory that Harvard adopted turned out to be not only foolish
but expensive. They adopted the theory that John Simon at Yale, another
erstwhile lawyer and a present law professor, has suggested-that the duty
of a university is to handle its portfolio as an ethical investor. He recently
wrote a book called The Ethical Investor.
So Harvard said, "Look, how could we possibly sell Gulf? It is a complicated question. Nobody is sure about it. After all, our investment people think
it is a good investment and we ought to hang onto it."
Then they spent about several thousand dollars repairing damages and
hiring police and having the Cqmmencement attended by earnest young men
with big signs about selling Gulf and all of the rest. Meanwhile Gulf stock
dropped about twenty per cent in the market. And meanwhile, the Mellon
family, who control Gulf, registered a secondary to sell many more shares
than Harvard owns. Life isn't very simple and the ethical action isn't so clear
in these things.
Some students came in to see me about this time and they said, "Look, you
are a Harvard graduate, and we think you can be of great help. We think
Harvard should sell its Gulf stock because the Gulf Company is acting immorally in Angola."
My reply was, "I don't think that you have to make that judgment. For all
I know Gulf probably is pretty moral in Angola. But I think that a university
has no business owning anything that is going to get it into coatroversy. The
function of a university isn't to get into complex controversies with ardent
professors and ill-informed students. Its function is to provide an education,
and the reason it should sell Gulf is a political matter. It should have gotten
the hell out, but it should get out quietly.
"Don't sell Gulf because of Angola. If the university doesn't own any othel
oil stocks, go out and buy a few, and then sell Gulf and the six other stock,
because you have come to the conclusion that you are better off putting thc
money into equities of retail distribution stores, so that you depart, but yot
depart gracefully."
But the students had read the book by Professor Simon of Yale Lam
School, and they said, "This isn't right. We have got to approach it morally
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and we want you to bring the moral issue out. Your company has re-housed
at one time a seventh of the black population of Boston. We think that your
company is the kind of thing that Harvard should own, and we want to carry
this controversy one step further. We are not only going to demand that they
sell'Gulf; we are going to demand that they reinvest the proceeds in your
stock."
Well, since our stock at that time was sliding a bit in the market, I had to
give that a long, hard thought.
But I figured that my function really was to educate the young men, and
so I said, "That's great, because Harvard will not only make a moral investment, they will probably lose money on it, and that will really delight you
fellows. But first of all, we have got to let Harvard know about our strip mining operations." And the poor kids leaped out of their chairs. "Strip mining!"
There were those who thought strip mining was better and those who
thought it was worse than doing business in Angola, and those who thought
both were equally bad, and those who were just confused. They finally stumbled out having, I think learned a lesson.
It is a lesson that I think counsel also needs to learn on these complicated
subjects-which is that the businessman has a central concern for the bottom line, but he has also a great many other concerns, and in most areas he
has done much better than he gets credit for.
The single largest polluter in almost every city in the United States is the
city itself. The single city that pollutes more water in the United States than
any other entity in the United States is headed by,Mayor Lindsey, and his
Commissioner of Pollution, Kretchmer, who wants to succeed him. That
would be a real recycling operation!
So you have to say to yourself that you live in a complicated world and
the function of the lawyer is to make distinctions clear and to achieve tradeoffs. Therefore, when you try to figure out how laws are going to get something done in this complicated society, you have to understand how the society works.
One of the difficulties is the thing that Professor Blumberg mentioned in
passing-the notion that management has, or even thinks it has, an exclusive
duty to produce maximum profits for the shareholders. That is called
"maximizing." When those of you with gray hair like mine studied economics,
that was what it was all about-maximizing! And it is all wrong, because
businessmen don't maximize.
Now there is an alternative theory, espoused by Professor Galbraith, which
is that the management primarily take care of themselves. His argument is
that members of management own practically nothing of the company, so
their chief goal in life is to climb up some ladder of executive succession and
enrich themselves by large amounts of bonuses and salaries and so forth.
Since they can get larger salaries if they have a larger company, they really
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don't pay much attention to the earnings and to the maximizing-they
largely concern themselves with growth, because the bigger the company,
the better off they are.
Professor Galbraith isn't entirely wrong. Penn-Central didn't happen because somebody focused with concentrated concern on maximizing return
on equity. But the central thrust of business, I think, most economists today
would describe as "satisficing." "Satisficing" is something in between maximization and the business world as seen by Professor Galbraith. It describes
a political function, and it relates to what Professor Blumberg was talking
about in having a Board of Directors with'different viewpoints on it.
We don't decide to elect a Committee as President of the United States
and have a black and an old person and a young one and a this and a that.
We say, "Let's elect ourselves a real shrewd political animal, and in one guy,
with fifty-seven political antennae, we will have a representative of everybody."
That is what the theory of "satisficing" is: that business management regards itself as having a primary duty of managing to get something done.
And if you are going to manage to get something done, you are not maximizing and trying to make the last buck on every transaction. But if you
don't want to spend what little money you have left paying lawyers to defend
you from take-over bids, the way our system works, you have got to make a
reasonable amount on the equity. So, as a consequence, you "satisfice."
You pay labor what you have to, and now and then you take a strike.
You pay the executives what you have to, and once in a while you overpay
your brother-in-law!
You pay your suppliers what you have to, to keep them alive and healthy,
but you don't overpay them unless you work for Chrysler and own part of
the supplier!
So, you end up with a very complicated society that on both analytical
and personal grounds has all sorts of complicated cross currents, and that
is "satisficing." But central to the "satisficing" is producing enough money
on the equity so that the stock will sell at a decent enough price that you
will be able to stay in the job.
Once you get this concept of business, you can then deal more intelligently with these questions of social responsibility. I say to myself, how can
I, as a business manager, know what I ought to do? Or, you, as either inhouse or out-house counsel to a business manager (that is a sort of a contradiction in terms, you know, because it is the in-house who is more privy to
the company's secrets) -what do you say to the manager who wants to know
what he ought to do?
Of course, there is a very easy answer, "Obey the law!" And the manager
says to counsel, "Well, all right, I will obey the law. What's the law?"
"Well", you say, "that is a very complicated question."
That gives you a start on the notion of the brackets within which I think
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we work. There is a floor, and the floor is the law, but not as written in the
books. After all, practically everybody who has had any trouble with water
pollution is being chased after with some law passed in 1885 or something
like that. That law has been there a long time, so it is not a question of the
law in the books-it is a question of the requirements of the law as society
expects them to be enforced. That is a floor of minimum social responsibility.
There is also a ceiling, and the ceiling is set by what I was talking about
before-competitive problems. The law requires me to pay my employees
what they negotiate out in a labor negotiation, but suppose I love them
and want to give them another ten dollars. That is fine if I have a monopoly
or a patent or something. But if I am in a bitterly competitive manufacturing
operation, I can't pay them more than a penny or two above what the
competition pays. And the competition is probably paying the minimum
wage, and so I am paying the minimum wage.
On the other hand, there is a lot of leeway generally in most businesses
between the ceiling that is set by competition and the floor that is set by legal
expectations. I think it is a duty of counsel to remind businessmen that if
they can throw money away in all sorts of other directions, if they can keep
the eighty-seven year old founding father on the board of directors at a cost
of fifteen thousand dollars a year, if they can every once in a while buy insurance from their brother-in-law, then they can afford to raise their contribution to the United Fund and the rest.
Within this range, narrow as it is, you are talking about immense amounts
of money.
The average American corporation pays out one per cent of its pre-tax
income to charity. I don't think there is any lawyer in the room who wouldn't
take on a contingent basis the defense of the company that pays four per
cent of its pre-tax income to charity, provided they were earning a reasonably good income. After all, you can deduct up to five per cent.
And if all we did was increase from one per cent to four per cent the pretax contributions to charity of American corporations, you would have
created a half dozen more Ford Foundations, with all the immense impact
that would have on American society.
So, when you come down to what are the relationships of business and
law to the social expectations of society, I think that you advise your client,
that he has two choices:
If he wants to have some space to sail his boat between the river and the
bridge, he can lower his floor, the river, or he can raise his ceiling, the bridge.
He can devote himself to trying to lower the river-"let's see if we can't repeal Social Security; that will give us some space to move around!" Or he
can try to raise the bridge. He can say, "God, I would love to do it, but the
competition won't." Why doesn't he then support a law to require them all to
do it?
Being in the coal mining business, I have been through that any number
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of times. Every time we talk about doing something about sulphur emissions,
there is some coal magnate who says, "My grandma drank that sulphur every
spring and she lived to be ninety-seven. I think a man needs a certain amount
of sulphur."
Every time we have a big argument about in6reasing the safety requirements of underground mining machinery, somebody at the meeting always
says, "Do you think, while we are at it, we could repeal the last laws?"
What you can do, then, is to persuade your clients that they have an area
within which they can operate. You can also persuade them that sensible
legislation can raise the river for everyone. And this will maintain the space
up to the bridge, because the amount of space competition permits you to do
more starts at the new higher level.
That is the guts, I think, of what a businessman today, who worries himself-as a lawyer must also do-about these problems of being logical, and
being moral, and surviving. In a changing society, with rising expectations
of conduct, you simply have to see that as you raise the level of your conduct, the competition raises theirs, and you are still left enough margin to
have some space above minimum legal requirements.
MR. GEORGE D. GIBSON: Now for our third topic-the relationship
between the corporation and society-which has been assigned to me.
If we still had faith in so-called "progress," business would have everything going for it. But we do not. The one-way street of science, says Jacques
Monod, is a
".... path that the Nineteenth Century devotees of progress by science
believed would infallibly culminate in a prodigious blossoming of humanity, while nowadays we' see opening before us an abyss of shadows."68

This is nothing less than a Copernican revolution. It brings to an end all
the beatitudes of the last three centuries. No longer can we equate gross
national product with happiness. Indeed an increase in production is viewed
with suspicion, for fear of its effect on environment, for fear of its effect on
humanity itself. As Charles Reich at Yale says:
the present transformation goes beyond anything in modern history. Beside it, a mere revolution, such as the French or the Russian,
seems inconsequential-a shift in the base of power." '6 9
The corporation, as the active vehicle of industry and capital, is naturally
identified with the industrial system. Doubts and complaints are therefore
directed against it. As Professor Staughton Lynd said:
68. ".

.

°
. trajet que le progressisme scientiste du XIX siecle voyait deboucher in-

failliblement sur un epanouissement prodigieux de I'humanite, alors que nous voyon,
aujourd'hui se creuser devant nous un gouffre de tenebres." JACQUES MONOD, Lr
HASAXD ET LE NECESSITE 186 (1970).
69. C.REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA, 350 (1970).
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"Our inevitable enemy in the coming years is the corporation.

'0

Or, as found by Hugh C. Hoffman,
"If, by word and deed, business cannot dispel public mistrust, further
'71
government intervention is certain."
Now this cosmic change is far more profound and fundamental than the
murder of one segment of society or the appropriation of property from one
group for another group. It involves nothing less than the transmutation of
our fundamental values and aspirations. As Professor George Cabot Lodge
says:
"You are indeed on the leading edge of a gigantic transformation in
Western civilization, a transformation which has been long in its building and which is calling into question ideas and assumptions which
were born in the 16th Century when the West began its passage out of
mediaevalism."2
It is impossible to change fundamental values and aspirations without
requiring corresponding changes in the purposes of corporate organization,
since it is the chargg d'affaires of society on the industrial scene.
The most forward thinkers of the last generation concluded .that corporate powers are held in trust. Today it may be more accurate to say that
corporate powers are held in sufferance. The powers of an aroused and
vigilant society, ind of its all-powerful spokesman government, cannot be
defied or resisted. As society wills, these powers may threaten, as in Campaign GM, or restrain, as by tax or antitrust, or sustain, as by tariffs or
subvention, or obliterate, as under the Public Utility Holding Company Act.
In short, toleration of the corporation as a competitive agency for
achieving an allocation of resources consistent with the most deeply held
convictions of society depends on identification of corporate activity with
those convictions.
Where, then, shall we look? In what direction shall corporate management peer? It is axiomatic that corporate management must identify the
various constituencies it must serve, to which it is responsive. In addition to
stockholders, we are told about employees and suppliers of capital, those
who supply the materials of industry, those who purchase the products of
industry, those who are middle men in either process, minority groups,
women (now statistically, and perhaps vocally, a majority), environmentalists, neighbors, news media, government and the general public. Particular
industries will need to assess the immediacy of their relationship to particular
70. Blumberg, Introduction to the Politicalization of the Corporation, 26 THE
RECORD, ASS'N BAR OF N.Y. 372 (1971).
71. Bus. WEEK, June 17, 1972, at 103.

72. Final Lecture in AMP 62, December 1971.
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ones of such groups, estimate their demand, calculate the probable channel
through which their power will be applied, foreshadow its impact and adopt
a proper responsive posture. This adaptation will necessarily evolve as
points of view become evident. No one can conceivably lay down in advance
a blue print for survival.
But as we grope for some unifying generalization, we may well remember the axiom of contemporary thinking laid down by Barry Commoner that:
'78
"Everything is connected to everything else."

Still more poignantly, he said:
".. . nothing can survive on the planet unless it is a cooperative part
'74
of a larger, global whole."
This leads directly to my first conclusion or suggestion, and that is that it
is not enough for corporate policy to look to multiple constituencies. It must
look to the totality of interrelated interests. This means first the people whom
its activities involve. The corporation must provide a forum for their participation in decision and in action. Only thus can it provide a creative role,
and reward with a sense of personal achievement. It must at the same time
make it possible to contribute to the partnership of man with nature by
which alone our fragile biosphere can be preserved and the human species
maintained. This is not a matter of managerial nobility. It is a necessity for
managerial survival and indeed for corporate survival.
Such grandeur cannot be approached by cultivation of myths or improvement of forms, howsoever desirable they may individually appear to be.
Shareholder democracy is one of these myths. It is inconceivable that the
massive body of uninformed stockholders could be a fructifying influence
on corporate policy. An illusion of pure form, I would suggest, is the notion
of Federal incorporation. Public powers to regulate, reshape and redirect
are equally effective regardless of the domiciliary scene. A change in the
corporate domicile does not make those powers either more or less effective. Election of directors from different corporate constituencies from different sources of society has become very fashionable. And it is meritorious,
to the extent that differing points of view can influence management to
larger decisions. But it must be remembered that directors who try to help
management manage are guilty of a serious mistake, as TWA has recently
75
demonstrated.
This brings us to my second conclusion, that the responsibility for exercising this basic leadership, this type of basic judgment, must rest directly
on the shoulders of top management. This means the top executives and
73.
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33 (1971).

74. Id. at 299.
75. Resignation of Goldberg from the TWA Board of Directors, NEWSWEEK,
30, 1972, at 47.
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also their top lawyers. It is a solemn responsibility. Its discharge may well
involve a relinquishment of some traditional powers' But without it the
enterprise may end. Unless management can succeed in this reorientation,
government will intervene. Of that there can be no doubt. Of the merits of
such a result there can be a good deal. The economic failure to be redressed
is the unlimited privilege accorded to technocracy and the inattention to
human needs. As the Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse reported:
"Many Americans, .due to the nature of their jobs in an automated
economic system, find little personal satisfaction in their work...-76
But machines, like the Sabbath, were made for man, rather than man for
the machine.
So now, what star shall we follow across this uncharted sea? There is no
fixed beacon. The good may well be reappraised from day to day and then
only by painful groping. But for an example we may turn to what may well
be called the most spectacular success story in American history.
That, I suggest, is supplied by the history of the Supreme Court. Some
of you may doubt that it has been such an unqualified success. But consider
with me the facts for a moment. Adopting the 18th Century dogma of
separation of powers, the Constitution of the United States establishes 3
separate departments of government, the legislative, the executive and the
judicial. Purists are wont to smile at the illogicality of the English, for there
the head of the judicial system presides over the House of Lords, which
until recently was a co-equal legislative house. But I suggest to you that
the Chief Justice of the United States is at the same time our preeminent
legislative authority.
The great leap was taken in Marbury v. Madison (1803). There it was
held that legislative acts explicitly in conflict with clear Constitutional provisions should be denied effect. This was the beginning of an endless adventure. The leap was bold enough when the Constitution was viewed as a
static document to be interpreted like a contract. But it took on different
dimensions with the concept of an evolving Constitution. That means, of
course, that the Constitution is now no more than a process of thought
which has meaning only as the Justices may declare, even though with that
degree of imprecision which often accompanies inspiration. (We all remember the Delphic Oracle.) At one time the Court may say that the National
Industrial Recovery Act is unconstitutional because of inadequate relation
to interstate commerce. 7" At another time the Court ma say that the Agricultural Adjustment Act is constitutional even as applied to a farmer using
his produce on the farm where it was raised.7 8 At one time the Court may
say that separate but equal school facilities are constitutional79 ; yet at an76.
77.
78.
79.

Wall St. J., April 4, 1972, at 20.
Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

208 • The Business Lawyer, March 1973
other time, the Court may hold that legislative action to that effect is un8 0
constitutional.
There can be no doubt that when the Court changes its mind at this level
of sovereignty and strikes down a legislative act previously sustained, it is
exercising a super-legislative power. Indeed the selection of Justices is not
wholly unlike the ritualistic elevation of a king, with the ceremony and
dignity so richly described in The Golden Bough. From that moment on
they speak with a new voice that embodies the tone of juristic history, but
effectively exercises the power of sovereignty. The Court is, in short, the
ultimate embodiment of sovereignty in America, so far as it can be localized.
Throughout its history the Court has been surrounded by controversy.
There have been times when the challenges were very grave, when the controversy was severe. The Dred Scott case was the overture to the Civil War.
The protectionist decisions of the early Thirties led to the celebrated Courtpacking effort of Franklin Roosevelt. But in each case the Court survived
because of the veneration in which it was held by the American people.
The relevant question, for our present purposes, is, how has the Court
been able to maintain its power of survival? It can be nothing other than
its success in identifying and articulating the fundamental aspirations of the
American dream. That which is every man's friend will not be put to naught.
We can see the agonies of appraisal when the Justices are forced to grapple
with new issues that introduce the future. The opinions in Sierra Club," are
a poignant example, as also those in the death sentence decision. 2 The
survival of the Court rests on the belief that it governs the American people
better than any other authority can be trusted to do. The tumult of presidential selections is no reassurance of rationality. The fragmentation of
Congress makes its decisions difficult to predict and of uncertain stability.
But, despite objections from one group or another to every decision on major
matters, the Court possesses the abiding confidence of the American people
that it is struggling, without fear or favor, to find and realize the public good.
The parallel for corporate leaders is now clear. Their offices and their
institutions will survive only if the public is convinced that they are contributing more to the public good, over the long term and in the most essential appraisal, than will result from any alternative. The American corporation must so harmonize its goals and methods with emerging public
values that it regains the basic confidence of the American people as the
best assurance of their economic wellbeing. There is nothing wrong with
making a profit. In fact it is socially necessary to make a profit, since otherwise no capital could be generated and no technology developed. But the
profit must be made in a method that commands admiration and reliance.
This is not to say that corporate management is expected, or even per80. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
81. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).

82. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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mitted, to roam across the country like Don Quixote attacking what it may
deem to be public evils without regard to their relationship to the corporate
purpose. Indeed this would subject the interests of stockholders to the utmost hazard. Rather the pursuit of excellence by corporate management
must be within the confines of the corporate purpose. As Voltaire said, at
the conclusion of one of his most brilliant sceptical essays, our conclusion
must be "cultiviez votre jardin" or "cultivate your own garden."
In this manner the fundamental objective of corporate management becomes not profit maximization, but profit optimization. While the challenge
is immediate and mortal, no other instrument of American enterprise has
shown equal powers of innovation. When aroused to this new task we may
feel confident that they will prevail. MAthe movement from status to contract has been completed, so also the movement from contract to consensus
will be completed.
But the hour is late and the obsolescence of knowledge escalates momently.
Since the top executive must constantly be looking beneath the surface and
"His duty is nowhere decreed," 8 3 he can only remember "the delicacy and
vulnerability of all the living species," among which "he, too, is a part of this
single web."'8 4
Can we then at last attempt any suggestions for the discharge of this
prophetic task? Perhaps one might start provisionally along these lines:
1. The philosophy of the business is more important than its technique, so top management should focus on the former and harmonize
the latter.
2. Developing creeds are more important than departing creeds, so
top management must be in continuous communication with the most
sensitive and innovative elements of society. -That is not to say they
must make friends with everyone, but they must be aware of everyone.
3. For this purpose it may be helpful to have the guidance of a full
time observer of the desires and beliefs of the young, the academic, the
literary and others who suggest oncoming standards of value.
4. Top management should have closer communication with the
middle ranks of management to impart a point of view, to receive a feedback from their own experience and to unify the corporate esprit de
corps.
5. Top management should create, or see that there is created, an
exposition of the corporate conscience in the journals of opinion, not
for the purpose of'persuading whatever management thinks is best, but
for the purpose of refining management thought until it is the best and
then demonstrating its conceptual validity so that makers of opinion
and decision, commentators, editors, lawyers and judges, may have
83. LE HASARD
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available a sound basis of analysis to offset the continuous stream of
anti-corporate opinion that now dominates the innovative press.
6. Ride with a loose rein, in obedience to the tolerant precept of an
English solicitor that:
"On the whole, you probably get the best results if, within reason, you
recognize and accept the independence and initiative of individuals
and groups."
In sum, the powers of corporate management, like those of the Supreme
Court, are immense, though never granted explicitly. They have grown by
assertion, but are maintained only by public trust. Corporate leadership rests
on economics, but looks above economics, rests on law, but looks beyond
law. It is a spiritual experience that will require humility and imagination,
perhaps also, in Fred Kahn's phrase, "apocalyptic vision."
PROFESSOR PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG: I have an inquiry as to the role
of collective bargaining in employee participation in corporate decision making: will trade unions try to bargain over what have been traditional areas
of management prerogatives?
My presentation has been primarily concerned with the relationship of
employees to the internal structure of the company: representation on its
board and ownership of its shares.
If I had a message, it was that in my opinion, the proposals for changes
of this nature would have viability and strength only to the extent that they
were adopted by trade unions and by workers themselves as fundamental
objectives. This question thus points up the fact that collective bargaining in
the United States outside of the corporate structure has been the traditional
arena for the advancement of worker objectives and the achievement of what
one might call economic justice.
I have no doubt that the trade unions will attempt to bargain over what
in the past has been regarded as traditional prerogatives of management. I
also have no doubt that trade unions will endeavor to represent in the future
groups, including junior executives, who previously have been regarded as
beyond the pale of trade union representation. In the United States, the life
of the relationship between the employee and the major corporation has been
represented by the collective bargaining process. The suggestions as to change
in the structure of the Board to advance employee objectives, must be regarded as visionary until such time as they are adopted as major union
objectives. Further, we must remember that there are eighty-three million
employed Americans and that trade unions today represent no more than
twenty million of them.
MR. ELI GOLDSTON: I have received this question: "Within the gap you
defined between the requirements of law and the need for sufficient profit to
keep management safe from effective challenge, do you have any guidelines
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for management in either seeking out opportunities for socially responsible
behavior or in responding to pressure groups?"
I might suggest something that we do within our own company: Years
ago when I first came to the company, I was brought a slip of paper to O.K.
It seems that in Philadelphia we had given $4500. I think it was to the United
Fund and it needed my O.K. The funny thing is that you get all sorts of
people that can spend a half a million dollars, and cahi keep seven fellows who
earn twenty thousand dollars a year on the payroll, but who are no longer
needed, but if you want to give fifty bucks to some charity, it has to come to
the head office.
So I signed and I said, "Tell me, why do we give $4500?"
"Well, that's what we gave last year."
So I said, "All right." But that night at home I got to thinking. Why did
we give $4500 the year before? We had closed down half of the facility,
and did that mean we really should have given half as much because we
had half as many employees in Philadelphia? Or because we had thrown
a lot of people out of work should we give more?
At dinner that evening I bumped into a chap who was Dean of the Florence
Heller School of Philanthropy. So we hired a couple of his crack graduate
students to look over what we were doing.
And this is a tip you might give some of your clients. They really ought
to audit what they are doing on charity. It is unbelievable.
We didn't know what we were doing. Some of the things that we were doing
were absolutely insane. We were giving $2,500 to a church at one of our
installations. When I found that out, I asked, "Why do we do it?"
The manager said, "If you don't want to do it, we won't do it." I said,
"No, why do we do it?" And he said, "Well, we were doing it when I came
here." I said, "When did you come here?"
"Fifteen years ago."
We never did find out why we started it, but we gave them $7,500 as a
three-year terminal gift and got rid of the annual payment.
But as a consequence of that, we decided to think through our charitable
giving, and what we then did was we made up a charitable budget. We say
that we are going to take about one per cent of our pre-tax income and we
are going to spend it where we make it.
That is quite a novelty because most corporations spend it at headquarters,
where the chief executive can be the Chairman of this year's Red Cross
drive and that kind of thing. if the company gives enough money.
So you start out and say to yourself, "I am going to put it back where
I got it." Then you find that you can't get the people to spend it. As the Chief
Executive, you have spent your entire life training them to be thrifty and to
chisel around and increase the return on equity. Now you say, "You have
$7,000 to give away," and he says, "I can get away with $500 easily!"
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Then what happens is that he sends some money back to headquarters.
When you get the money back at headquarters, as we do, we take our principal officers, our so-called senior vice presidents, and give them each a kind
of power of appointment over $2,500 per year for the company to give to
anything that is tax deductible and not religious. This is an immense time
saver, you see, because I used to have a fellow who would come in and say,
"Don't you think that the company ought to give something to the new drive
at East Hampton Community College?"
I would say, "Where in the hell is East Hampton?" And he would say,
"In Montana." I'd say, "We don't have anything to do in Montana." And he
would say "Yes, but my daughter's going there."
Then it would develop that if he were less happy because his daughter isn't
so happy, the corporate efficiency would decline and all of that kind of thing.
You eliminate all that nonsense. You say, "Take $2,500 bucks out of the
company. Do what you damn please with it, subject to three conditions:
"One, it is tax deductible.
"Two, it isn't religious.
"And three, it won't embarrass the-company."
I suggest to you that what you do is to start out with the goal: "I've got to
give one per cent away." Then you try to give it back where it came from,
and you end up with a kitty that is left. With that kitty, first of all, you buy
the executives off your back with a sort of a power of appointment, and then
you take what is left and you plunk it into two or three very imaginative
things. You will set some examples and you will also get your people excited.
If you just simply say to your secretary, "Everybody that shows up that you
can't get rid of, give them $500 and get rid of them," you end up just sort of
sprinkling it over the atmosphere like a bit of rain on a hot summer day and
it all disappears.
What I am suggesting to you is that you go about it thoughtfully, and it
is counsel's function to encourage thoughtfulness.
MR. GEORGE D. GIBSON: I have a simple question:
"If profit is not to be the only measure of corporate management, what
other objective measures do you suggest?"
Let me comment on each clause:
One is, if profit is to be the only measure of corporate management, that
is, the success of corporate management, the corporation is a candidate for
early governmental take-over.
Secondly, the concluding phrase, "What other objective measures do you
suggest?"
"Objective measures" is a synonym for a statistical measurement or yardstick. The burden of my remarks was that the problem is not susceptible of
such a simplistic answer. It must depend upon a sensitive executive appraisal
of the changing needs and enduring aspirations of the society the corporation
serves.
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Notwithstanding the sensitivity of our appraisal, it will do little good unless the corporation has a profit at the bottom line, as Eli says.
Presupposing a profit, and one that endures despite the contemporary social accounting standards, nevertheless the corporation must, within the
parameters of its corporate purpose, supply a service better than can be
done by other means and reward the society that makes its profit possible.
The reason why corporate management should be compensated is its responsibility in making from day to day that very difficult and changing
appraisal.

